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Abstract: Measures of concentration and competition in the financial sector are important to 
determine public policies. However, cooperatives, and in particular in the context of small 
developing countries are largely ignored in economic literature. The empirical analysis is 
descriptive due to data availability and analysis the loan market of large credit cooperatives. 
However, findings are indicative and tentative. Results show that, in general, a) the cooperative 
system is highly concentrated, b) the loan market of large financial cooperatives is not 
concentrated, c) however, most loan modalities are highly concentrated, some are competitive 
and some are not, d) there is no indicative evidence of market abuse of the three largest credit 
cooperatives.    
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1. Introduction 
Financial institutions, as banks and non-banks, are crucial in the allocation of resources to 
the real economy thereby contributing to economic growth and reducing inequalities by 
converting savings into investments. This function is essentially the same in all economies 
(Beck et al. 2000; King and Levine 1993; Merton 1990; OECD 2009). Financial stability, 
where the market can withstand external shocks without major disruption of their primary 
economic function, occurs through transparency and good governance, which is a core function 
of supervisory (Barra and Zotti 2017; Jarmuzek 2018). Cooperatives, as a new form of a 
business society, have not lost strength and are an essential part of the world's economies, in 
particular, on a regional level where they can spur local economic growth (Hakenes et al. 2015). 
Cooperative history knows several examples of success of countries that went through a great 
depression and high unemployment rates such as Germany (1860), the United Kingdom 
(1840), the United States (1934), Sweden (1930), and Finland (1902). All of them are located 
today among the countries with the highest GDP in the world and their economic successes 
correspond largely to cooperatives (Birchall 2009). The cooperative movement, in general, is 
recognized for its impacts on the development and sustainability of communities in a broad 
sense, in education and information and when creating jobs (see McKillop et al. 2020 for an 
overview). In particular, financial cooperatives, as part of the financial sector are of interest for 
various reasons. First, they take deposits and make loans, which are the same core services that 
offer banks, but distinguishes them from financial NGOs that are not permitted to take deposits 
(Westley and Shaffer 1997, p. 4). Second, they serve a market mainly ignored by commercial 
banks (Westley and Shaffer 1997), due to agency frictions as information asymmetry and 
contract enforcement (Torre de la et al. 2012). They are also seen as a vehicle to access finance, 
thereby reducing income inequality (World Bank 2008). Credit unions have a different 
ownership structure and a unique dual business nature (Mazzarol 2018). Last, but not least, 
measures of concentration and competition in the financial sector are important to determine 
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public policies regarding welfare-related issues (Bikker and Haaf 2002). However, despite their 
potential importance, cooperatives are largely ignored (Kalmi 2007). There is a gap in the 
literature of economics associated with empirical evidence of the potential and reality of 
cooperatives, and in particular in the case of small developing countries (Kalmi 2007; Lele 
1981). To cope with the limitation of data availability, the empirical analysis will be descriptive 
and explanatory focusing on large financial cooperatives (type A). The focus on financial 
cooperative has the advantage of providing specific policy implications. However, despite the 
raised restriction, the methodology applied reveals some interesting results based on a set of 
different structural measures commonly – and less commonly – used. To the best of the author's 
knowledge, this paper is the first in analyzing the market structure and related measures of 
financial cooperatives in Paraguay. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
link between market structure, competition, and conduct, following a section (3) on credit 
cooperatives in Paraguay. Methodology and data description are discussed after that in section 
4 before concluding with a discussion in section 5.   
2. Literature Review  
Measures of concentration and competition are important and give a first insight of a 
given market structure and conduct in a particular market (Bikker and Haaf 2002). The aim 
of such an exercise should be oriented to public policies and decision-makers to distinguish 
between healthy and unhealthy market situations (Miller 1955). 
 Households require loans due to liquidity constraints. In the absence of a developed 
capital market, entrepreneurs and firms largely depend on the financial system as an external 
source of funding. A lack of competition due to concentration may result in unfavorable 
conditions for consumers due to high financial intermediation costs, efficiency losses, and 
harm the public interest (Bikker and Spierdijk 2009; Poghosyan 2012).  
 A great number of empirical research on the concentration – performance relationship 
is based on the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework, which posits 
that concentration determines conduct, and conduct determines performance. The hypothesis 
is that firms in high concentrated oligopolistic markets may have higher average profit rates 
than firms in less concentrated or atomistic markets (Bain 1951, p. 294). However, banking 
literature gives ambiguous results on the relationship between concentration and competition, 
which makes it even more relevant in practice.1 
Demsetz (1973) and Maudos and Nagore (2005), for example, suggest that changed cost 
conditions are the main cause of changes in the market structure, while the market structure 
is significant in explaining market power differences. Boyd et al. (2006) analyzed two large 
samples (U.S. sample and an international sample) with different properties. They find that 
there is a positive and increasing relationship between concentration and bank profits. They 
further find that bank's loan-to-asset ratios are lower in concentrated markets indicating a 
lower bank commitment to lending as opposed to holding other assets such as bonds. 
Beck et al. (2004) find that concentration increases difficulties for firms to access 
financing, and in particular in countries with low levels of economic and institutional 
development. This effect decreases moving from small to larger firms, with larger foreign 
bank shares, and a smaller share for state-owned banks. In a more competitive banking 
system financially dependent sectors grow faster (Claessens and Laeven 2005), and in 
particular small firms have less short-term debt and their debt is of longer maturity 
                                                 
1
 For an excellent literature review on the relationship between concentration and competition, see e.g. Berger 
et al. (2004) and Lee (2007). For an excellent literature review of measuring competition, see e.g. Leon (2014). 
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(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999). Martinez-Peria and Mody (2004) analyzed bank 
spreads in Latin America during the late 1990s and find that the presence of foreign banks 
influences the level of spreads. Their interest margins are generally lower, primarily due to 
lower costs of operation. 
 However, the alternative efficient structure (ES) hypothesis states that the market share 
reflects the efficiency of banks. Ben Naceur and Omran (2011) investigated competition and 
performance across a broad selection of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. 
They find that an increase in risk-taking has a positive effect on net interest margin by shifting 
the risk to the borrower's interest rate, and similarly increase cost-efficiency. They find also 
that corruption increases net interest margin, thereby reducing social welfare. However, the 
effect of more risk-taking in a competitive banking sector may result in an increase in banking 
failure and financial instability (Allen and Gale 2004; Beck et al. 2006; Mishkin 1999). Moral 
hazard problems due to risk shifting in a competitive environment may even induce excessive 
risk-taking (Jensen and Meckling 1976).2 Implementing capital controls are not sufficient to 
achieve Pareto efficiency (Hellman et al. 2000). In contrast, Kick and Prieto (2013) find 
strong support that increased competition lowers the riskiness of banks and, in consequence, 
countries with better-developed institutions that foster competition are less likely to suffer 
systemic risk (Beck et al. 2006). Extensive regulation and particularly anti-trust policies have 
a protecting effect against monopolistic behavior and cartel forming, which may improve 
competition in the sector (Bikker 2007). Rojas-Suarez (2016) finds that a lack of enforcement 
of the rule of law by weak institutions directly affects the willingness of depositors to use 
formal financial institutions, and in combination with concentrated markets may discriminate 
low-income borrowers or small and median enterprises (SMEs). Poor enforcement of 
contracts increase interest rates, reduce loan amounts, and maturities. Poor enforcement is 
costly and reduces recovery rates (Bae and Goyal 2009). This is particularly true in the case 
of cooperatives whose members are risk-averse. 3  Moreover, education and financial 
intermediation of the banking system are significant for economic growth, which indicates 
the importance of adequate public policies (Beck et al. 2000). Huangfu et al. (2017) find that 
an oligopolistic banking structure is welfare-maximizing because with an increasing number 
of competitors each bank will receive a smaller share of deposits, which in turn leads to a 
constraint in lending, meaning lower welfare. 
 Investigating bank profitability in nine Latin American countries between 1997 and 
2005 Chortareas et al. (2011) find support for the efficient structure hypotheses, in particular 
for larger banking markets. The Paraguayan banking market revealed a significant negative 
relationship between market structure (market power) and profitability (Chortareas et al 
2011). 
The Center for Global Development (CGD 2016) not just recommended similar 
regulations for similar financial activities, but also, in particular, “regulations aimed at 
protecting consumers from fraud, abuse, and discrimination” (p. 16).  
In the context of cooperatives and particular credit cooperatives, there is still an ongoing 
economic discussion due to the dual nature of cooperatives. On the one hand, cooperatives 
are too profit-oriented to be considered a non-profit organization and too social to be just a 
for-profit business model (Levi and Davis 2008). Cooperatives are private economic firms 
and therefore one of many other types of economic firms, organizing economic activities 
(Ayadi et al. 2010, p.6). The partners own their cooperatives and therefore have an aversion 
to risk. They do not pursue short-term gains or benefits and they do not respond to the 
interests of shareholders that could lead to greater risks, motivated by inadequate incentives 
                                                 
2 For example, with deposit insurance, depositors do not have the same incentive to monitor the riskiness of 
assets. Another example is "too big to fail" bailouts as occurred in the aftermath of the last financial crisis.  
3 A simple civil lawsuit in Paraguay may take several years to be settled. 
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(Birchall and Ketilson 2009; McKillop and Wilson 2014). Credit Unions often state that their 
primary mission is to offer best services to their customers, as opposed to maximizing 
cooperative's profits (EACB 2004, p 6), and hence, they might be more focused on market 
share, rather than profitability. However, robust profit growth is an important condition for 
cooperatives to safeguard their continuity, financing real economy, credit, and to continue 
adding value to their customers (Groeneveld and de Vries 2009). A more competitive market 
structure has a positive relationship on financial stability (Boyd et al. 2006; Fiordelisi and 
Mare 2014; Barra and Zotti 2017), mostly due to lower volatility of cooperatives’ return 
(Hesse and Čihák 2007). Due to ambiguous results, concentration is not a sole indicator of 
competition (Bikker et al. 2007; Bos et al. 2009; OECD 2010).  
3. Cooperatives in Paraguay  
The cooperative movement has existed for centuries and has had a strong impact on the 
development of societies. The Paraguayan economy depends largely on agriculture and, in 
particular, soybeans, which determine the sign of GDP growth. However, this growth of the 
economy is limited by ecological and geographical restrictions. At the end of 2018, almost 
half (49.9%) of the economically active population (EAP) were a member of at least one 
cooperative, and penetration at the national level reached 25.6% of the total population, even 
though, urban and rural areas show different numbers. While applying the same national 
population distribution for the EAP, the penetration for urban areas reached about 40%, and 
for the rural population about 24%.4 The proportion of the urban population to the total 
population increased by about 5% but decreased by about 7% for the rural population 
between 2011 and 2018.  
The Paraguayan cooperatives were strengthened between 1995 and 2003, where they 
were able to capture deposits that were lost in the banking circuit as a consequence of a series 
of banking crises, which culminated in the demise of about 15 banks and 40 finance 
companies (Franks et al. 2005). 
 The National Institute of Cooperativism (INCOOP)5 is the supervisory authority in the 
cooperative sector. Its main activity is to control and promote cooperatives on the national 
level. Members how have claims against a cooperative may resort to the INCOOP after 
paying an administrative fee.6 Large cooperatives (type A) are subject to regular controls. 
In this paper, all cooperatives at the national level are divided by their legal nature into 
three sectors: savings and credit cooperatives (CAC), production cooperatives (CP), and 
other cooperatives (OTC, e.g. cooperatives for services and cooperatives for consumption). 
Within these sectors, the cooperatives are divided by size into type A, type B, and type C. A 
cooperative type A indicates a large cooperative with assets above USD 11 million (type B, 
USD 1 – 11 million; type C, under USD 1 million) at the end of each financial year and 
subject to recategorization according to the regulations of the INCOOP. Therefore, in theory, 
it would be possible for a cooperative, for example, to be recategorized from type B to type 
A during the research period. The following Table 1 gives an overview of the evolution of 
cooperatives in Paraguay. The average debt of a cooperative member reached approximately 
USD 1,714 at the end of 2018, with an increase of 6.38%, on average. However, this debt 
can be biased because some members do not have an active credit or some members have 
multiple credits in different cooperatives at a time and therefore the average debt can be 
higher. In the period between 2010 and 2018, the average debt per member increased by 
almost 60% (59.53%). 
                                                 
4
 The proportion of Urban/total population = 0.60, on average. 
5
 Instituto Nacional de Cooperativismo. 
6
 In recent years, however, the cooperative sector has repeatedly appeared negative in the national media due 
to charges for sexual abuse of employees, insider lending, or even election fraud.  
 5 
 
Table 1. Evolution of cooperatives in Paraguay. 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Quantity 408 488 437 404 407 357 250 385 328 
Loans 1,472 1,976 2,343 2,729 2,983 2,996 2,906 3,108 3,382 
Members (000) 1,239 1,336 1,405 1,481 1,544 1,610 1,647 1,727 1,785 
Quantity (%) -  19.61 -10.45 -7.55 0.74 -12.29 -29.97 54.00 -14.81 
Loans (%) - 34.24 18.57 16.47 9.31 0.44 -3.00 6.95 8.82 
Members (%) -  7.83 5.16 5.41 4.25 4.27 2.30 4.86 3.36 
Notes: Figures reflect the sum of all active cooperatives (Type A, B, C) and all sectors. Gross Loans are in 
millions of USD. The lower part represents annual changes on a YoY basis. Data: INCOOP, Exchange rates 
from Paraguay Central Bank data. 
3.1. Large credit cooperatives in Paraguay 
Paraguay is geographically divided into 17 departments and the capital district Asuncion. 
About 41% (18) of the large credit cooperatives are located in the country’s capital Asuncion. 
Further 12 cooperatives are located in the central department, and 14 larger credit 
cooperatives are distributed in 10 departments, while six departments do not have a large 
credit cooperative at the end of 2018. More than 96% of all members belong to a credit 
cooperative (CAC) and more than 83% (83.60%) of these members belong to a large financial 
cooperative. To avoid a sudden shift in loan demands, cooperatives generally use time of 
affiliation before granting loans. 
The following Table 2 shows the evolution of the large financial cooperatives within the 
period 2011 to 2018. The evolution over time reveals a continuous increase of active 
cooperatives (on average, +8.15%) and members (+7.66%). 
Table 2. Evolution of credit cooperatives type A. 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Quantity 26 27 31 31 38 38 38 44 
Loans 1,171 1,343 1,633 1,799 1,836 1,811 1,912 2,127 
Members (000) 858 982 1,037 1,131 1,168 1,278 1,330 1,433 
Quantity (%)  - 3.85 14.81 0.00 22.58 0.00 0.00 15.79 
Loans (%) - 14.69 21.59 10.17 2.06 -1.36 5.58 11.24 
Members (%) -  14.45 5.60 9.06 3.27 9.42 4.07 7.74 
Notes: Figures reflect the sum of all financial cooperatives Type A. Gross Loans are in millions of USD. The 
lower part represents annual changes on a YoY basis. Data: INCOOP, Exchange rates calculated from 
Paraguayan Central Bank data.         
In contrast, the next Table (Table 3) shows the evolution over time for the smaller credit 
cooperatives and reveals a different picture. Registered small cooperatives decreased by 
4.46% and loans decreased by about 8%, on average.7 The number of registered small 
cooperatives for each year does probably not reflect active cooperatives.8 
Table 3. Evolution of financial cooperatives type C. 
                                                 
7
 The Government implemented a tax for loans in July 2016. The same was repealed with law no.   
  178/18 about two years later. At first glance, there is no clear evidence that this tax affected loan    
  supplies. 
8 According to data provided, INCOOP registered 130 small cooperatives in 2018, but just 73 were  
  active in loan supply. 
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  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Quantity 250 210 189 197 169 106 180 130 
Loans 39,689 35,914 32,727 44,381 23,352 17,185 27,301 11,206 
Members (000) 116,798 97,259 104,571 79,375 82,881 66,428 70,350 41,580 
Quantity (%) - -16.00 -10.00 4.23 -14.21 -37.28 69.81 -27.78 
Loans (%) - -9.51 -8.87 35.61 -47.38 -26.41 58.87 -58.95 
Members (%)  - -16.73 7.52 -24.09 4.42 -19.85 5.90 -40.90 
Notes: Figures reflect the sum of all financial cooperatives Type C. Gross Loans are in thousands of USD. The 
lower part represents annual changes on a YoY basis. Data: INCOOP, Exchange rates calculated from 
Paraguayan Central Bank data. 
 Almost half (48%) of the small cooperatives disappeared. Between 2011 and 2018, 
small financial cooperatives lost more than half of their members with an accelerated annual 
average of 12%. At the end of 2018, the participation of small cooperatives in loans granted 
reached an almost insignificant 0.37%. Although the Paraguayan economy shows steady 
growth in recent years, small cooperatives seem to be disoriented and in free fall.  
4. Data and Methodology 
This section explains the data selection process of the two samples, the methodology 
applied, and a description of the structural measures used in this research. 
4.1. Data 
The National Cooperative Institute (INCOOP) as the solely supervisory authority, 
provided data regarding the Paraguayan cooperatives. Tables with information on the number 
of cooperatives, number of members, and loans granted are the results of consolidated and 
aggregated yearly data. For the purpose of this paper, we asked INCOOP for monthly data, 
disaggregated by loans granted by modality, e.g. consumption, health, small enterprise 
among others, for the large cooperatives for the years 2010 to 2018. In general, creditors can 
be divided into independent companies and individuals, other individuals, and non-profit 
organizations. Also, active debts can be distinguished in short, medium, and long-term loans. 
For the purpose of this investigation, these distinctions have been omitted. We received data 
for 2016, 2017, and 2018. We excluded all data for 2017 due to a large number of 
cooperatives with missing monthly data. We then selected cooperatives with 12 complete 
monthly observations and obtained a sample for 2016 with 32 cooperatives and 2018 with 30 
cooperatives. To address sample bias, only those were selected which presented 12 monthly 
observations in both years. We obtained a paired sample of 22 cooperatives for 2016 (≈ 58% 
of all cooperatives) and 2018 (50% of all cooperatives).9 Half of the large credit cooperatives 
in the paired sample (11) are located in the capital Asuncion, further three in the central 
department, and eight large cooperatives are distributed across seven departments. Besides, 
for the calculation of the net interest margin (NIM) data from the balance sheets of the three 
largest cooperatives were used. However, just a few large cooperatives (type A) publish their 
annual reports on their respective website. 
   
4.2. Methodology 
                                                 
9 Official data received from and published by the INCOOP are not consistent with monthly aggregated data 
for the two samples. For descriptive purposes, we report these numbers as they are in Table 1 through Table 
3, therefore interpretations     
  should be made with caution. 
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This paper begins with descriptive statistics of the cooperative system on a national level, 
to illustrate concentration and trends over time. Next, we focus on large financial 
cooperatives by applying a set of static structural measures to a sample for the years 2016 
and 2018, following the methodology applied in previous research (e.g. Bikker and Haaf 
2002; Brown 2018; d’Outreville 1998; Pfingsten and Rudolph 2002; Tabak et al. 2009). 
The Lerner index often used to identify market power in the financial sector research, 
maybe not a good indicator in the case of non-maximizing profit firms such as cooperatives, 
because it is no guide to determine changes in loan demand (Miller 1955, p. 123).  
This research uses a set of different measures to explore the loan market structure and 
various loan modalities on the institutional and product level in the cooperative sector. In 
addition, the NIM for the three largest cooperatives, ranked by total loans granted, is 
calculated for the years 2015 – 2018 using consolidated balance sheet data made available 
by these cooperatives on their official website. 
4.2.1. Concentration ratio (CR) 
The most widely used measure of concentration in empirical research is the k-firm 
concentration ratio (CRk) because it requires limited data and is easy to interpret. 10 
Concentration ratios may be useful as a basis for preliminary market screening (Miller 1955). 
The Paraguayan law does not mention any measurable criteria defining monopoly, 
concentration, or dominant position accept the concentration ratio in the case of a merger.11 
This might hamper the role and efficiency of the National Competition Commission 
(CONACOM), regulating national competition since 2015. The concentration ratio measures 
the sum of k-largest firms in the market, according to the formula: CRk =  ∑ si,t,ki=1  (1) 
The structural change within the cooperative system may suggest a concentration or 
diversification. There is also the possibility that the members of their respective cooperatives 
were happy with the services provided and therefore there was no significant change in the 
structure during the investigated period. The book value (in the local currency, Guaranies) of 
the loans granted to members i at the end of year t in a particular cooperative (type A, B, C) 
j is defined as Xi; t; j. Therefore, the proportion of the loans of partners i at point t in sector j 
can be defined as follows: 𝑥𝑖,𝑡,𝑗= 𝑥𝑖,𝑡,𝑗∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡,𝑗3𝑗=1  (2) 
4.2.2. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
A measure of concentration commonly used in the literature, and which comprises a 
naïve diversification, is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Hirschman in 1945 and Herfindahl 
in 1950 proposed the index independently as a measure of concentration in an industry 
                                                 
10 The European Union (2004) states that a market share of 50% or more “may in themselves be evidence of 
the existence of a dominant market position” (Paragraph 17 of the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings. The UK 
considers a market share in excess of 40% as a threat to competition. 
11 Law 4956/13 and Directive 1490/14. The law 4956/13 in his Art. 14 mention that if the result of any merger 
is equal or higher than 45% market share or if the gross income of the merger exceeded the amount of 100,000 
monthly minimum wages in the last accounting year, the transaction should be registered with the respective 
authority. 
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(Hirschman 1945; Herfindahl 1950). The index is calculated as the sum of the squares of a 
firm’s market share i at time t: 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑(xi,t,) ²nj=1  (3) 
The HHI is equal to 1 when all loan exposures are granted to a single type of cooperative 
and it equals 1/n when all three types of cooperatives receive the same amount of loans. More 
generally, the bound of the index is between 1/n ≤ HHI ≤ 1. A high index indicates a 
concentration, while a low index indicates a diversification of the loan portfolio of 
cooperatives of different types.12 In addition to linear trends, non-linear developments of 
specialization measures over time are also conceivable, due to regulatory changes or events 
affecting the system as a whole, such as the 2008/2009 financial crisis or, in the particular 
case of Paraguay, imposing a tax on loans. To identify non-linear trends over time and to 
quantify diversification, the Spearman's coefficient (Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation, 
RC) is used (Jahn et al. 2015; Kamp et al. 2005). If the RC takes the value 1, the concentration 
of the loan portfolio increases with each step of time, regardless of size or amount. On the 
contrary, if RC = -1 shows a decreasing HHI and a growing diversification over time. 
4.2.3. Dual of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI (d)) 
In contrast to the k-firm concentration, the HHI will reflect changes in the market 
structure among smaller banks (Corvoisier and Gropp 2001). However, the HHI can lead to 
erroneous conclusions, because the index is compatible with different market structures 
(Marfels 1971), in particular when the number of participants is small. The HHI in a single 
market structure can change because the number of firms changed. The HHI does not 
consider this information. Therefore, and to make the results comparable with other regions, 
the dual of the HHI (d) is constructed in the case of large cooperatives. The dual of the series 
X is: d = 1 −  1n. HHI𝑥 (4) 
The HHI (d) represents the fraction of cooperatives that do not have market participation 
and varies from 0 to the maximum of 1-1/n (Chang et al. 2005; Tabak et al. 2009). 
4.2.4. Berry Index (BI) 
The inverse of the HHI is the Berry Index (1971), which measures diversity directly.13 
The index is bounded between 0 and 1-(1/n) (Lee and Brown 1989). The Berry Index (BI) is 
0 in the case of no diversity and reaches its maximum at 1-(1/n) in the case of equal 
distribution. The general form of the index is: 𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖,𝑡2  𝑛𝑖=1  , where s   (5) 
is the market share of firm i at time t. 
 
                                                 
12 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010) define an HHI level below 1500 
as an unconcentrated market, between 1500 and 2500 as moderately concentrated, and above 2500 as a 
highly concentrated market. 
13
 The Berry Index is also known as the Simpson Index, e.g. Lee and Brown (1989). 
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4.2.5. Entropy (E) 
The Entropy measure, a quantity measure with its origin in thermodynamics (Brissaud 
2005; Zhou 2013), is nowadays universally related to order or information (Brissaud 2005; 
Shannon 1948; Williams 2002) and has been used in economic research, as well as in 
management, marketing, and other sciences to measure dispersion within an industry, brands, 
or products (Attaran and Zwick 1987). Information in this context may be understood as the 
inverse of uncertainty quantifying the degree of localization or delocalization (Garbaczewski 
2006, p. 2). This makes entropy a natural candidate for measuring diversification (Kirchner 
and Zunckel 2011). 𝐸 = − ∑ 𝑝𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔2  𝑝𝑖 𝑛𝑖=1  ,     (6) 
where p is the probability distribution of firm i in an underlying market. In this paper, 
we use a relative entropy measure (RE) using the formula RE = E/log2 (N). This relative 
measure ranges from [0, 1] and varies inversely to the degree of concentration, making it 
therefore more interpretable and comparable with other structural measures.    
4.2.6. Stenbacka Index (S) 
Melnik, Shy, and Stenbacka (2008) introduced a measure to characterize a dominant 
position of a firm in a particular market. This measure can be calculated using the formula  𝑆𝐷 = 12 [1 −  𝛾 (𝑆12 −  𝑆22 )],    (7) 
where γ > 0, and is a competition parameter, which reflects market obstacles imposed by 
the largest firm, powerful buyers, economic regulation or intellectual property rights. In this 
paper, we set γ = 1 which can be seen as a natural benchmark “because it coincides with the 
threshold of 40% below which the OFT Guidelines may not consider a firm to be dominant” 
(OFT Guidelines 2004, p. 70). 
4.2.7. Kwoka’s Dominance Index (D) 
This index, proposed by John E. Kwoka Jr. (1977), focuses on the pattern of shares in an 
industry such as the gap between the market share of the largest company and its competitors. 
Where large gaps occur between consecutive shares dominance is present and the index 
increases toward unity while values close to 0 mean that no single company dominates the 
market. The index is calculated as the sum of squares of market shares differences when 
companies are ranked by size and is given by  𝐷 = ∑(𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖+1)2, n−1i=1   (8) 
where s
 
is the market share of each producer i ranked by size. 
4.2.8. Dominance index (P) 
Pascual Garcia Alba (1993) proposed an index to measure dominance in a given market. 
This index is also known as the concentration of the concentration index and indicates the 
distribution of the HHI. The Mexican Federal Competition Commission (COFECE) used this 
index until 2015 to measure concentration. The Commission, however, argued that the index 
is essentially a measure of the asymmetry of market participants and has no clear theoretical 
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foundation (COFECE 2015, p. 3). However, in this paper, we present the results of this index 
to give some practical insights. The index is given by the formula: 𝑃 = ∑ ℎ𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1  ,     (9) 
where hi = si
2
HHI. 
5. Results 
5.1. Cooperative system on a national level 
Table 4 shows that the cooperative sector is almost identically mirrored by the large 
credit unions and reveals a clear concentration in the cooperative system at the end of 2018 
with an HHI of 0.8807, and in particular for large cooperatives (type A). In turn, the small 
cooperatives (type C) lost about 86% (86.59%) of their loan market share at an average rate 
of -14.71%. The distribution of the Spearman coefficient of the HHI reveals that the 
cooperative system has still a larger share of a diversified system (55.55%) at the end of 2018, 
however, with a clear trend towards an increase in concentration. The same situation can be 
observed for the large cooperatives, while medium and smaller cooperatives (type B and C) 
with an HHI of 0.00358 and 0.00001, respectively, experienced a tremendous loss in 
participation by about 88.89% (type B) and type C by almost 100% over time.  
Table 4. Evolution of financial cooperatives. 
 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) – loans 
     
Year System Type A Type B Type C 
2010 0.76359 0.75168 0.01116 0.00075 
2011 0.76003 0.74673 0.01277 0.00052 
2012 0.76615 0.75287 0.01293 0.00035 
2013 0.79025 0.77932 0.01074 0.00018 
2014 0.81231 0.80466 0.00735 0.00030 
2015 0.87412 0.87067 0.00337 0.00008 
2016 0.87182 0.86792 0.00386 0.00004 
2017 0.86081 0.85654 0.00418 0.00010 
2018 0.88070 0.87711 0.00358 0.00001 
RC 
Coefficient 0.9167 0.9167 -0.8167 -0.9333 
with RC < 0 0.5555 0.5555 0.1111 0.0000 
Note: The calculation of the index is based on the loan portfolio for credit, 
production, and other cooperatives. Data from INCOOP. 
The trend of losing participation and the significance of medium and small cooperatives 
in the loan market is undoubted. The largest increase in concentration occurred in 2015. The 
RC coefficient supports the trend towards a concentration for large cooperatives and 
divergence for medium and small cooperatives. As the complementary 1-d of the HHI (d) 
reveals, the Paraguayan cooperative system is in the hands of about 0.5% of all cooperatives, 
that is, 2 large cooperatives are responsible for the most of all loans in the system (see Table 
A1 in the appendix). 
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5.2. Samples with firm-level data 
However, a market structure can change due to more or fewer cooperatives. The HHI 
does not consider this information. Therefore, in addition to the HHI, the dual of the HHI – 
HHI (d) – is calculated as a more robust measure (Cheng 2005; Tabak et al. 2009) with a 
focus on the two samples on large credit cooperatives with firm-level data.   
Table 5. Concentration in the large cooperative sector (type A) – part 1. 
   2016       2018    
 CR3 HHI HHI (d) BI CR3 HHI  HHI (d) BI 
Total Loans 0.550 0.122 0.627 0.878 0.556 0.123 0.632 0.877 
Consumption 0.629 0.158 0.713 0.842 0.762 0.150 0.696 0.850 
Health care 0.624 0.186 0.615 0.814 0.888 0.645 0.897 0.355 
Housing 0.708 0.229 0.782 0.771 0.701 0.259 0.797 0.741 
Micro enterprise 0.579 0.217 0.730 0.783 0.752 0.328 0.809 0.672 
Small enterprise 1.000 0.349 0.044 0.651 0.948 0.445 0.625 0.555 
Median enterprise 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.802 0.274 0.392 0.726 
Education 0.654 0.257 0.741 0.743 0.693 0.208 0.700 0.792 
Other 0.646 0.168 0.574 0.832 0.739 0.234 0.695 0.766 
Farming 0.904 0.558 0.776 0.442 0.916 0.528 0.790 0.472 
Industrial 0.931 0.610 0.727 0.390 0.996 0.489 0.488 0.511 
Refinancing 0.590 0.149 0.647 0.851 0.572 0.145 0.638 0.855 
Credit cards 0.780 0.224 0.721 0.776 0.794 0.275 0.786 0.725 
Note: The table shows the concentration ratio of the three largest cooperatives, the concentration index, and the 
dual of the concentration index within different loan modalities for the samples of 2016 and 2018. 
The loan market within the large financial cooperative sector is generally unconcentrated 
in both samples and shows almost no variation between 2016 and 2018, as indicated by the 
HHI (Table 5, first row). The Wilcoxon nonparametric statistic reveals no significant 
difference between the two samples (w = 124 and w_critical = 66). However, not all 
cooperatives participate in each loan submarket, therefore, the market structure within 
different loan modalities shows that 8 out of 12 modalities in 2018 are highly concentrated 
while four are moderately concentrated. Most notable increases in concentration in 2018 are 
in health care, micro-enterprise, and the category other.14 The HHI for health care jumped 
from 0.186 in 2016 to 0.645 in 2018. The complementary 1-d of the HHI (d) reveals that 
loans for health care, for example, are in the hands of about 10.3% of all cooperatives in the 
sample, that is, two cooperatives are responsible for most of the loans in this modality. Small 
enterprise (2016) and industrial loans (2018) illustrate the practical usefulness of the HHI (d). 
Small enterprise loans in 2016 indicate a high concentration of 0.349. However, the dual of 
HHI indicates a highly competitive market where all cooperatives (n = 3) have more or less 
equal market shares. The same for industrial loans in 2018. The HHI indicates a highly 
concentrated market (0.489), however, the HHI (d) also indicates a competitive market (n = 
4) where about two cooperatives hold competitive market shares. 
The following Table (Table 6) shows alternative concentration measures for large 
financial cooperatives. All measures (Table 5 and Table 6) are easy to interpret, except the 
Kwoka Dominance Index (D). 
 
                                                 
14
 Other is a loan modality that is not further specified and includes loans that do not belong to one of the 
modalities (consumer, housing, health, etc.) mentioned above.  
 12 
 
Table 6. Concentration in the large cooperative sector (type A) – part 2. 
        2016    2018   
  P E (norm) S D P E (norm) S D 
Total Loans 0.273 0.802 0.493 0.008 0.290 0.802 0.492 0.010 
Consumption 0.349 0.722 0.484 0.016 0.353 0.746 0.490 0.021 
Health care 0.493 0.764 0.446 0.051 0.980 0.335 0.183 0.547 
Housing 0.527 0.657 0.453 0.054 0.704 0.659 0.409 0.096 
Micro enterprise 0.746 0.735 0.409 0.125 0.813 0.591 0.358 0.192 
Small enterprise 0.398 0.980 0.446 0.101 0.772 0.593 0.324 0.200 
Median enterprise 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.417 0.790 0.439 0.063 
Education 0.762 0.695 0.393 0.144 0.440 0.691 0.463 0.033 
Other 0.306 0.763 0.393 0.013 0.541 0.696 0.439 0.052 
Farming 0.926 0.457 0.239 0.381 0.877 0.453 0.268 0.297 
Industrial 0.944 0.462 0.209 0.443 0.574 0.581 0.405 0.167 
Refinancing 0.373 0.793 0.499 0.030 0.371 0.802 0.499 0.031 
Credit cards 0.397 0.676 0.499 0.034 0.581 0.596 0.418 0.074 
Notes: The table indicates different alternative structural measures for total loans and submarkets on an 
institutional level. 
In general, all indices of concentration measures are rather similar and point in the same 
direction, which raises confidence in the appropriateness of these measures. However, a short 
glance reveals the widespread in these values. Microenterprise loans in 2016, for instance, 
show a low concentration ratio, a moderate HHI, and a relatively high HHI (d). The 
dominance index (P), however, indicates a high value, which points to a dominant position 
of a market participant. Furthermore, the Stenbacka index (S) indicates a market share 
threshold of about 41%. Further analysis of this submarket reveals a market share of more 
than 43% for the largest concentration ratio. Loans for education in 2016 show the same 
characteristics, a relatively low concentration ratio, a moderate HHI, and a relatively high 
HHI (d). While, in turn, the dominance index (P) reveals a high value and the Stenbacka 
index (S) indicates a market share threshold of about 40%. An individual analysis reveals a 
market share of more than 47% for the largest concentration ratio, while the next largest 
competitor holds about 9.6% of the market. Therefore, the use of a small set of concentration 
measures may facilitate decision-making, and in particular, in the case of cooperatives, where 
other measures of dominance or market power, e.g. the Lerner Index, maybe no good 
indicators. 
5.3. Product dimension 
On the sub-product dimension (Table 7), the HHI reveals a persistent highly 
concentrated market at the end of 2018 compared to 2016 but decreased from 0.357 (2016) 
to 0.289 (2018). The normalized Entropy measure (E) indicates a moderately diversified 
portfolio (2016: 0.596; 2018: 0.681), while the Dominance index (P) points to a dominant 
product (2016: 0.774; 2018: 0.751). Consumption is still the preferred loan modality in large 
financial cooperatives (2016: 55.9%, 2018: 50.0%). We do not observe any significant 
increase in productive loans, but a slight increase in the share of loan refinancing. We assume 
that the decrease in loans for consumption might be due to a decrease in GDP (from 4.31% 
to 3.36%) and GDP per capita (from 2.94% to 2.35%) since GDP per capita can be viewed 
as a proxy for the size of the banking market. A simple correlation matrix (Table A2) reveals 
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a negative relationship between the HHI and the GDP per capita (-0.23)15, indicating that 
richer countries have less concentrated banking systems, confirming previous research (e.g. 
Boyd et al. 2006). Furthermore, the correlation matrix reveals a positive correlation between 
the HHI and urban population, indicating that countries with a more geographically 
distributed population have less concentrated banking systems. 
Table 7. Market share and concentration in the product dimension. 
 2016 2018 
  Market Share Market Share 
Consumption 0.559 0.500 
Health 0.003 0.008 
Housing 0.122 0.114 
Microenterprise 0.146 0.104 
Small enterprise 0.000 0.023 
Median enterprise 0.000 0.012 
Education 0.002 0.003 
Other 0.048 0.050 
Farming 0.019 0.037 
Industrial 0.013 0.001 
Refinancing 0.067 0.077 
Credit cards 0.020 0.070 
CR3 0.828 0.719 
HHI 0.357 0.289 
HHI (d) 0.745 0.712 
Dominance index (D) 0.774 0.751 
Entropy (E) 0.596 0.681 
Stenbacka index (S) 0.354 0.382 
Notes: CR3 is the concentration ratio of the three largest cooperatives, HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), 
HHI (d) is the dual of the HHI.  
The following Table (Table 8) aims to identify possible market abuse of the three largest 
cooperatives by calculating the Net Interest Margin (NIM). The NIM is calculated using the 
following formula: (interest income from loans – interest paid to depositors)/total loans. This 
formula does not consider other income from fees or administrative charges. However, the 
NIM may also depend on other factors than market power. Maudos and de Guevara (2004) 
find a positive and significant effect on NIM and credit risk, indicating that a higher NIM 
implies a higher credit risk. In other words, if a bank’s NIM decreases, this may induce a 
bank to accept more risky loans and indirectly increase credit risk (Angbazo 1997).  
The ranking by market share (total loans) did not alter between 2016 and 2018. At first 
glance, results are ambiguous and do not give a clear indication of market abuse due to market 
power. Two of the largest cooperatives increased market share, but just one also increased 
his net interest margin. One cooperative lost market share, however, increased its net interest 
margin. The market share distribution of the dominant product (consumption) indicates that 
the largest cooperative (cooperative 1) lost market share between 2016 and 2018 and at the 
same time the net interest margin decreased. The second-largest credit cooperative increased 
its market share as well as their NIM. However, the third-largest lost market share, but 
increased their NIM. To analyze market abuse more in detail it would be appropriate to 
                                                 
15
 Boyd mentions a negative correlation of -0.30 between HHI and GDP per capita. 
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evaluate each sub-product individually with more data. Market share for refinancing loans, 
as a proxy for credit risk, decreased slightly for two cooperatives. 
  
Table 8. Comparison of Market share and NIM of the three largest cooperatives.  
    2015 2016 2017 2018 
 NIM     
Cooperative 1  9.81% 11.60% 10.29% 10.32% 
Cooperative 2  6.04% 7.34% 8.49% 7.85% 
Cooperative 3  19.61% 18.90% 21.33% 20.69% 
 Market share     
 Total loans     
Cooperative 1  - 22.07% - 22.85% 
Cooperative 2  - 18.55% - 18.98% 
Cooperative 3  - 14.37% - 13.78% 
 Market share      
 Consumption     
Cooperative 1  - 28.05% - 26.67% 
Cooperative 2  - 21.69% - 22.82% 
Cooperative 3  - 5.82% - 4.62% 
 Market share      
 Refinancing     
Cooperative 1  - 25.18% - 24.82% 
Cooperative 2  - 4.79% - 5.84% 
Cooperative 3   - 25.46% - 25.11% 
Notes: NIM (Net Interest Margin), Cooperative 1, 2, 3 indicate the three largest cooperatives ordered by market 
share for total loans. This order will remain constant for comparison. 
6. Results and Discussion 
This paper has analyzed the market structure and competition of the cooperative system 
on a national level and, in particular, the credit cooperatives in Paraguay. The cooperative 
system, on a national level, is highly concentrated with an increasing trend between 2010 and 
2018. At the end of 2018, the system was in the hands of about two large cooperatives. 
However, analyzing a paired sample of large financial cooperatives reveals, in general, no 
concentration in the loan market. This result changes looking at different loan modalities: 8 
out of 12 submarkets are highly concentrated. Some of these are competitive others are not. 
We do not find indicative evidence of market abuse in the general loan market of the three 
largest cooperatives. Consumer credits, which account for about 50% of all loans granted, 
are the preferred product rather than productive investments. In line with Boyd et al. (2006), 
we find that GDP per capita is negatively correlated with concentration, while the urban 
population shows a positive relationship. Interestingly, the correlation matrix indicates a 
negative relationship between NIM and concentration. We account this to the fact that the 
NIM is based on the CR3, therefore inducing new entries due to expectations. However, we 
expect that this relationship will change with new entries or including more cooperatives in 
the calculation. 
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The INCOOP should not charge any fee neither to cooperative members nor to non-
members for claims or complaints against cooperatives to promote democratic principles and 
transparency. 
However, it can be argued that most of the credits of large financial cooperatives are 
directed to consumption or housing (mortgage) and therefore, in the sense of Tirole (1985), 
crowding out funds for more productive investments, and in consequence have a negative 
effect on growth. Therefore, liquidity constraints on households may favor a higher growth 
rate (Jappelli and Pagano 1992). The negative growth effect may be worsening in times of 
economic shocks when households experience liquidity constraints and cooperatives 
compete for funds in the financial system. In consequence, cooperatives should shift away 
from mobilizing savings toward improving their efficiency of productive investments. These 
indicative results call for more research on the cooperative' role in national economies. 
  
Funding: This research received no external funding.  
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest. 
Appendix A 
Table A1. HHI and dual HHI of the cooperative system and large cooperatives. 
  System     Type A  
 n  HHI HHI (d)  n HHI HHI (d) 
2010 408 0.76359 0.99679 52 0.75168 0.97442 
2011 488 0.76003 0.99730 49 0.74673 0.97267 
2012 437 0.76615 0.99701 50 0.75287 0.97344 
2013 404 0.79025 0.99687 54 0.77932 0.97624 
2014 407 0.81231 0.99698 54 0.80466 0.97699 
2015 357 0.87412 0.99680 62 0.87067 0.98148 
2016 250 0.87182 0.99541 60 0.86792 0.98080 
2017 385 0.86081 0.99698 64 0.85654 0.98176 
2018 328 0.88070 0.99654 69 0.87711 0.98348 
 
Table A2. Correlation matrix. 
  HHI GDPpC GDP PopUrban PopRural NIM 
HHI -      
GDPpC -0.23 -     
GDP -0.25 1.00 -    
PopUrban 0.93 -0.32 -0.35 -   
PopRural -0.93 0.32 0.35 -1.00 -  
NIM -0.44 0.86 0.74 0.82 -0.82 - 
Note: NIM includes data from 2015-2018 and is calculated as a yearly average of the CR3 in the loan market. 
All other variables include data from 2010-2018 of the cooperative system. 
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